In its ascription of a tripartite personality to Nietzsche, my title recalls the most important book of the American Nietzsche reception, Walter Kaufmann's *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, which appeared in 1950 and has gone through four editions. Kaufmann's volume was important precisely because it allowed the American public to speak again of Nietzsche after he had been associated for a dozen years with the National Socialists, with war, with anti-Semitism, with immorality and barbarism, and with a system of values inimical to the American and western way of life. Kaufmann's monograph, as well as his many subsequent translations of Nietzsche's writings, removed him from the political sphere and placed him in the role of existential theorist, whose main concerns were being, art, the human mind, and creativity. Kaufmann thereby acted as an important midwife in the birth of Nietzsche as a philosopher, an event that takes place only after the Second World War. Although he was accorded the label of philosopher early on by many readers, he was rarely taken seriously by academic philosophers: in both Germany and the United States his writings were initially more attractive to creative writers and to a general public searching for alternatives to the mainstream bourgeois ethos. He dispensed life wisdom and inspiration, not academic philosophy. The works of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger in German-speaking nations, and of Kaufmann in the Anglophone world, which were all widely promulgated after the war, legitimized Nietzsche's credentials in the world of abstract thought and extricated him from the political fray surrounding his writings in their initial reception. Kaufmann's book thereby represents an overcoming in its own right: Nietzsche was no longer considered the philosopher of the Third Reich -- his sister was blamed for doctoring his texts and delivering him into the hands of the far right. Kaufmann assures us that he detested politics and was really apolitical, or even anti-political; he was not anti-Semitic, but anti-anti-Semitic; he was not a supporter of German nationalism, but its most vocal adversary; and any citations from his books that found their way into Nazi propaganda were simply distortions and lies.

The National Socialists and theorists of the political right, against whom Kaufmann's book was directed, were in fact not the first to appropriate Nietzsche for sectarian concerns, but rather continued a reception of Nietzsche since his death that focused primarily on his use for social and political causes. In Germany and the United States writers from the left consistently viewed Nietzsche as an ally in their struggles against the conservative establishment. Feminists, free-thinkers, liberals of all stripes, socialists, communists, anarchists, and libertarians all regarded Nietzsche as a comrade in arms for their causes, as someone who anticipated their own predilections, and who could be called upon to support the agendas they were promoting. Some readings of Nietzsche may contribute to his appropriation for these types of political movements: if we consider his writings to be essentially an impassioned defense of the individual, then we are able to reconcile several of his more common political interpretations. Anyone who has read Nietzsche thoroughly, however, has to concede that a leftist political reception goes somewhat against the grain. Nietzsche's comments on movements that we traditionally associate with emancipatory trajectories, from the workers causes of the late nineteenth century to the first women's movement of the same era, were consistently derogatory.
Nietzsche not only opposed these attempts at collective action aimed at securing equal rights for subaltern groups, but also rejected the enlightenment notion of an inherent equality of human beings as a philosophical absurdity. He considered himself the last anti-political German because he disdained parliamentary democracy as a means of governing national affairs. In his writings democracy and any political movement that seeks representation of excluded groups are pilloried as antithetical to nature and its natural hierarchies. What is therefore remarkable in the early Nietzsche reception, not only in the United States, where his writings were less available, but even in Germany, where his books were readily accessible to the general public, is the sense among leftists that Nietzsche was a friend of progressive thought.

In the United States Nietzsche's initial reception was blocked initially, albeit temporarily, by the rumor that he was in reality a deranged individual whose writings consisted of barely coherent rants and screeds. Chiefly responsible for this view was Max Nordau's book *Degeneration*, which reached the United States a year before any of Nietzsche's own writings had been translated, and which achieved an enormous popularity in the Anglophone world as the most authoritative source on current trends in European thought. In England *Degeneration* went through eight printings in 1895, the year the translation first appeared. In the United States it was reissued four times during the same year and was ranked ninth in sales among all types of books published. Although not every reviewer agreed with Nordau's complete censure of Nietzsche, his portrayal colored America's views for many years. Nordau devotes his lengthiest chapter to Nietzsche in a section on "Ego-Mania." Nietzsche is the quintessential philosopher of ego-mania, but his sins as a writer and a thinker are hardly limited to his putative glorification of overblown egotism. Nordau disparages Nietzsche as a philosopher since his writings, which renounce any philosophical system and logical argumentation, consist of "a succession of disconnected sallies, prose and doggerel mixed, without beginning and ending" (419). The content matches the form. Nietzsche's "insane gibberish" (422) is both false and nescient: "If the conceits which he wildly ejaculates -- as it were, shrieks forth -- are examined somewhat more closely, we cannot but marvel at the profusion of fabulous stupidity and the abecedarian ignorance they contain" (440). Nordau completely dismisses Nietzsche's claim -- and that of his disciples -- that he is an original thinker, untimely in his judgments and removed from his contemporaries. On the contrary, Nordau asserts that Nietzsche trades in commonplaces, the "shop-worn rubbish of great philosophers" (445), and that he is a thinker deeply ensconced in the spirit of Bismarckian Germany (470). If there is any originality, it lies merely in Nietzsche's "simple infantile inversion of a rational train of thought" (446.) Ultimately Nordau attributes Nietzsche's rejection of Judeo-Christian value systems to an inherent sadism, and, contending that his writings were produced "between two detentions in a lunatic asylum," he declares him "obviously insane from birth" (453). American readers could hardly have been encouraged to engage with a philosopher Nordau calls "a disgrace to the German intellectual life of the present age" (472), and those who gave full or even partial credence to Nordau's account must have regarded Nietzsche as a delirious, monomaniacal, misanthropic madman.

Although in the two decades after the appearance of Nordau's book Nietzsche achieved an enormous popularity in the United States, we find ample evidence of philosophically inclined writers who contend that his works are not suitable for the
American public. Four years after the publication of *Degeneration*, the editor of *The Monist*, Paul Carus, penned a lengthy review of Nietzsche under the title "Immorality as a Philosophic Principle," which echoes some of Nordau's concerns. Nietzsche is a genius, Carus, admits, but he is mentally deranged, and this derangement is the "natural result of his philosophy." His philosophical outlook is antithetical to Carus's avowed preferences, since it abjures objectivity and embraces an irrational and ultimately unverifiable speculation:

Nietzsche's philosophy is unique in being throughout the expression of an emotion, -- the proud sentiment of a self-sufficient sovereignty. It rejects with disdain both the methods of the intellect, which submits the problems of life to an investigation, and the demands of morality, which recognise the existence of duty. Nietzsche claims that there is no objective science save by the permission of the sovereign self, nor is there any "ought," except for slaves. He prides himself as "the first Immoralist." (575)

Carus considers Nietzsche to be "a nominalist with a vengeance" (580), and, for this reason, although his philosophy is "inconsistent and illogical," it is still based on the "logic of facts" (578). Admirable in Nietzsche's philosophical outlook are his originality and enthusiasm, as well as his radical questioning. Carus is especially interested in *Zarathustra*, which is "original and interesting, full of striking passages, sometimes flashes of deep truths," and he connects the over-man, the "quintessence of Nietzsche's philosophy" (588), with notions found in Emerson. Ultimately, however, Nietzsche is regarded as "a bundle of contradictions" (599) whose appeal is restricted to immature minds and to restless spirits discontent with the status quo. It is quite possible, Carus comments presciently, that over the course of time Nietzsche "will become the philosopher of demagogues" (606). Although he confesses to enjoy "the rockets of Nietzsche's genius" and to recognize "the flashes of truth which occur in his sentences, uttered in the tone of a prophet," he concludes that he must condemn his philosophy "as unsound in its basis, his errors being the result of an immaturity of comprehension" (611). For professional philosophers as well as the general intelligentsia in the United States Nietzsche may be stimulating, but at the turn of the twentieth century Carus finds him inappropriate for serious students of the mind.

Others concurred. Edwin E. Slosson, perhaps the foremost popularizer of science in the early twentieth century concluded that "it is not likely that [Nietzsche] will ever be read much in the United States." This statement is indeed a bold one if we consider that Nietzsche's popularity was at the very moment of this article's appearance, in 1908, on the ascent. Slosson reasons that since Nietzsche's repute in Germany is the result of his opposition to Schopenhauer, his appeal outside of that intellectual context will be minimal. He concedes that some catchy phrases may become prevalent in the United States, and that some "infiltration" will also occur by means of literature and works on sociology and ethics. But he obviously believes that Americans, like Germans, will grow weary of Nietzsche with the passing of time: "German philosophers," Slosson writes, "are, like their plays and operas, shipped over to America when the Germans have got tired of them" (697). He is not oblivious to the current fascination with Nietzsche's writings, but attributes it to his oppositional rhetoric: "Any man who runs amuck thru the conventions of civilization is bound to attract attention." In the end this fascination will diminish, and Nietzsche's reputation will fade with it. Similarly Louise Collier Wilcox, in an essay entitled "Nietzsche: A Doctor for Sick Souls," maintains that Nietzsche is ill
suited for an extensive American reception. She admits that Nietzsche and Whitman have many points in common: "They share the same grandiose egoism, the same courage to 'sing myself,' the same impatience with sick conscience, repentance, and remorse, and, finally, the same sense that as the individual acquires independence, freedom, and an expansive outlook he will become whole and well." Despite these similarities, Willcox judges Nietzsche's entire attitude to be alien "to the American temper." Nietzsche stands opposed to core values that she associates with American culture: "He abhorred commercialism, humanitarianism, facile optimism, any form of casual, easy-going light-heartedness" (768). In her view Nietzsche conceives the world as evil, not in the religious sense, but because the individuals who populate it have failed "to make it and themselves better" (768). For the mainstream American intelligentsia, represented by Carus, Willcox, and Slossom, Nietzsche is a fascinating writer whose brilliance occasionally shines through a bleak, blurry, and ill-founded philosophical outlook. But his works are not substantial enough to withstand the test of time and certainly inappropriate for the United States in the twentieth century.

That Nietzsche, despite the pessimistic assessments of persons closer to the mainstream of intellectual life, nonetheless gained a secure foothold in the United States is the consequence of interest from groups on the fringes of the social order. Similar to Germany, where Nietzsche was likewise first popular with non-conventional thinkers, his reputation spread initially in circles that considered themselves anti-establishment and even oppositional. Sometimes the opposition involved an aesthetic alternative, and Nietzsche achieved great renown among the aesthetic elite for his championing of art, for his embrace of individual freedom, and for his knowledge of, and preference for, classical antiquity. The reception of Nietzsche by James Huneker, for example, is based largely on an aesthetically informed understanding of Nietzsche's life and works. But in the initial years of his American reception the persons attracted to Nietzsche were far more likely to be outsiders with regard to the political status quo than the aesthetic or cultural. Time and again left-leaning intellectuals and activists found in his writings a rhetoric and the substance that supported their causes. Despite Nietzsche's own relative indifference toward or aversion to social and political movements, he was frequently recruited for movements whose goals were to attain a more democratic and more egalitarian society. As we have already noted, a careful reader of Nietzsche's writings would probably consider it odd that socialists, anarchist, and feminists regarded him as an ally or precursor. He consistently railed against any movement that promoted equal rights and validated with equal consistency hierarchy and elitism. What attracted leftist and left-leaning intellectuals to Nietzsche, however, was not his views on socialism, anarchism, or feminism, but rather his expressions of hostility toward the institutions of middle-class society, which they also rejected, as well as his suggestive manner of expressing this hostility. Nietzsche could therefore be an uncomfortable confederate: but long before he became identified with the political right, he was claimed as an inspiration for the left.

That socialists were interested in Nietzsche and his writings is somewhat unusual. There is perhaps no political grouping Nietzsche censures as often and as consistently. Nietzsche's actually contact with socialists or with the working class was minimal; his knowledge of the growing movement in Germany came almost exclusively from second-hand sources, since his acquaintance with the literature written by socialists was likewise negligible. There is no evidence, for example, that he read anything by Karl Marx, or that
he had even taken notice of his name, although we can ascertain that Marx was mentioned in books that Nietzsche read or had in his library. The only socialist writer who figures prominently in his writings is the philosopher Eugen Dühring, a prolific Berlin professor and rabid anti-Semite, who exerted considerable influence on the party during Nietzsche's lifetime, and whose views Nietzsche considered antithetical to his own. A personal acquaintance with socialists or communists was rare in his biography. The fourth Congress of the International took place in Basel just five months after his arrival in 1869, and the parades and festivities, as well as the appearance of Bakunin, an old friend of Richard Wagner, must have drawn Nietzsche's attention. But we find no mention of it anywhere in Nietzsche's correspondence or in the reminiscences of friends and relatives. Nietzsche was negatively impressed by the Paris Commune, and the reported destruction of cultural artifacts by this people's revolt may have influenced his views for the rest of his life. But Nietzsche mentions socialists and socialism infrequently during the early years of the 1870s. Only in the latter part of the decade, and then increasingly in the 1880s, does he launch a veritable campaign against this movement. He associates socialism with the masses and with an unjustifiable tendency in the modern world toward equality and democracy. In this regard it is the secular continuation of Christianity and embodies for Nietzsche everything that is wrong with contemporary society. "Wen hasse ich unter dem Gesindel von Heute am besten?" Nietzsche fulminates in The Antichrist. "Das Socialisten-Gesindel, die Tschandala-Apostel, die den Instinkt, die Lust, das Genügsamkeits-Gefühl des Arbeiters mit seinem kleinen Sein untergraben, - - die ihn neidisch machen, die ihn Rache lehren" (KGW 6.3: 242, Whom among today's rabble do I hate the most? The Socialist rabble, the Chandala apostles who undermine the worker's instinct, his pleasure, his feeling of contentment with his little state of being -- who make him envious, who teach him revengefulness). These remarks typify his attitude toward socialism in his mature writings and would appear to preclude any favorable socialist reception.

Socialists in the United States, however, managed to overlook Nietzsche's venomous attacks on their movement and party, and found other, more compatible, qualities in his thought. Writers like Jack London believed they had discovered in Nietzsche someone who understood the nature of the working-class struggle in which they were engaged and used his thought and images liberally in their writings. Nietzsche's liberationist rhetoric, his visionary appeals to a better future, and his ruthless critique of the existing order were the chief features attractive for socialist intellectuals. His writings were not considered in opposition to the more obvious socialist texts of Karl Marx, but rather as a further and welcome addition to the socialist cannon. Indeed, Nietzsche's books were regarded as material worthy of dissemination among the masses. For this reason Charles H. Kerr and Company, the oldest Socialist publishing house in the United States, brought out Nietzsche's Human, All Too Human in 1912 in the series entitled "Library of Science for the Workers." Nietzsche's volume thus appeared in the company of books by Jack London, Clarence Darrow, Upton Sinclair, and Karl Marx. The volume was advertised as one that "told the facts about human conduct to those who are not afraid to read them." Nietzsche was seen as an antidote to capitalist regimentation and education. His work was called upon to instruct workers to resist the institutions of capitalist society and to take action outside of the religious sphere of influence that keep them in mental servitude. The life wisdom that Nietzsche dispenses in this aphoristic
work was conceived as a subversive alternative for the working class: "As a help to clear thinking on the every-day problems of life, we do not know its equal," comments the Socialist Book Bulletin. What Nietzsche provided was support for a rejection of bourgeois norms, as well as inspiration for combating the oppression of the social order. His affinity with socialism was not one of direct affirmation, but rather a more indirect and purported call for overcoming the mental, spiritual, and institutional fetters associated with capitalism.

We can find a socialist or quasi-socialist reading of Nietzsche in many journals that appeared in the early years of the twentieth century. In Current Literature, for example, in an essay on "The Education of the Superman," we read that this term, composed in a "half mystic, half poetic, spirit," "is assuming an almost democratic significance." The superman is taken to be an ideal, not for an elite race of individuals standing above the mass of humanity, but for humankind as a whole. The superman "is coming to mean the ideal which every man sets before himself and strives to realize. In this sense, the Superman is simply a symbol of humanity raised to its highest power." The essay is assisted in this interpretation by George Bernhard Shaw, the noted socialist whose play Man and Superman helped popularize the term for an Anglo-American audience. Shaw's drama represented a turning point in Nietzsche reception in the Anglophone world and countered to a large degree the pernicious influence of Nordau's volume. Shaw, however, the writer of the essay insists, does not go nearly far enough. Calling on the writings of William James, the author discusses how individuals normally perform below their maximum potential, but can be spurred on to great achievement through bursts of energy. The conclusion is that although Nietzsche did not propose the task, implicit in his philosophy is the goal of humankind: "the education of the Superman" (74). In subsequent issues of the journal other aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy are treated in a similar fashion. His anti-Christian outlook is found to be consonant with an endeavor to improve the whole of humanity. Since Nietzsche claims that Christianity weakens humanity, his goal in polemicizing against it is to improve the lot of individuals and the society they inhabit. And in a later piece discussing whether Nietzsche was a madman or a genius the author summarizes the humanist Nietzschean perspective that informed discussions in Current Literature: "Nietzsche's affirmations and negations were alike intended to clear the way for a humanity that should fulfil his dream and his ideal -- the Superman. He used the word as the early Christians used the phrase 'Kingdom of God.' It was a high and holy symbol prefiguring all that the universe had been in travail to produce." The vision of Nietzsche and Nietzscheans as the vanguard of human improvement, and of his writings as a guide to overcoming the obstacles in the world thwarting individual achievement, was a powerful attraction for intellectuals of socialist persuasion.

Not all socialists were uniformly convinced of Nietzsche's worth. John Spargo, for example, in the pages of the International Socialist Review comments on the publication of the English translation of Human, All Too Human in Kerr's press with considerable skepticism. "I have read a good deal of Nietzsche's writings," he comments, "and it has always been a puzzle for me what professed radical thinkers could find in his endless negations." He continues by citing a remark made by Alfred Russell Wallace, who wrote that the inevitable result of the development of a Superman must be "the development of an Oligarchy, to which philosophers, poets, scientists, inventors and
artists would be subservient." Nonetheless, Spargo too finds much to praise in Human, All Too Human, which he considers Nietzsche's "clearest and most coherent" work. Nietzsche is not a socialist, Spargo observes, and was even violently opposed to socialism. But, he continues, "the Marxist will find that there is much in common between Marx and Nietzsche. Just as Marx shows the influence of economic conditions upon social evolution, and upon the ethical concepts of classes, Nietzsche shows the influence of economic conditions upon individual ethical concepts." In Spargo's judgment Nietzsche is something of an economic determinist: "The little book might be fairly described as an application of the extreme theory of economic determinism to personal conduct." Thus although Nietzsche was not a socialist himself, his book can be safely recommended to the socialist community. It is a challenging volume, and it calls into question cherished notions of conventional thought. And anyone who is not upset by a challenge to the usual way of thinking about the social order is encouraged to delve into Nietzsche's book in order to learn valuable lessons he dispenses concerning ethics in the contemporary world.

Other socialist Nietzscheans were less equivocal in their praise. Walter Lippmann in his early socialist phase cites Nietzsche approvingly as an illustration of a philosopher validating a new culture of self-creation and autonomy. Joseph E. Cohen calls on Nietzsche for support in positing ethical relativity; Nietzsche provides evidence that the inalienable and purportedly universal rights enshrined in constitutions are nothing more than the values of the bourgeoisie at a particular point in their ascent to power. But perhaps the most interesting adoption of Nietzsche for a socialist agenda comes in an essay by the prominent radical Robert Rives La Monte in the International Socialist Review. Rives La Monte demonstrates the uncanny ability to transform the most important Nietzschean concepts into notions useful for the working class. Nietzsche is a child of his age, he asserts, and as such his main topic had to be the contradictions of capitalist society: accordingly "his chief theme seized upon the violent contradiction between the ruthless self-seeking of Capitalism in an age when the cash nexus had become the only tie between man and man and no mercy was shown, no quarter given upon the fields of industrial and commercial warfare, and the religion of love, sympathy and self-sacrifice professed in all capitalist countries." After reviewing briefly Nietzsche's biography and attributing his vision of power and strength to a personal rebellion against his own impotency, Rives La Monte turns to the familiar pairing of Apollonian and Dionysian. These terms can be most readily understood, he claims, as a translation of conservative or reactionary versus revolutionary or iconoclastic. For this reason, even though Nietzsche railed against the rabble, which, Rives La Monte concedes, refers to himself and his readers, "we Socialists must recognize him as a brother revolutionary" (12). Indeed, the Dionysian is the embodiment of the class-conscious proletariat displaying its strength in revolutionary action:

You and I would like to see the Proletariat aware of its own tremendous strength, glorying in it, and resolved to use it to emancipate themselves and humanity; we would like to see them living in the actual world of reality instead of dreaming in the fictitious world of apollonian or bourgeois art; and our highest and ultimate hope is to see them revelling in the joy of the Earthly Paradise, undeterred by any preacher or moralist. Only a dionysian working-class can accomplish the Social Revolution. The rank and file of the Socialist Party today are undoubtedly dionysians. (13-14)
Nietzsche's remarks on ethics are likewise fashioned into something useful for the working class. Rives La Monte contends the Nietzschean claim that Christianity is a slave-religion and a slave-ethic brings him into close proximity with Marx, who similarly opposed the opium of religious belief. For this reason he emphasizes that "To-day the World's workers need not Jesus, but Dionysos" (16). Rives La Monte is less sanguine about the usefulness of the superman, a notion attractive to other socialist thinkers. He judges it to be too vague and too closely connected to the blond beast. Indeed, he states that he does not regret that Nietzsche never completed his revaluation of values since it was connected with "that ever-varying phantasm and chimera, the Superman. Insanity came in time to save him from this reductio ad absurdum" (18). He concludes his discussion of Nietzsche for Socialists by recommending highly that socialists sample Zarathustra, but cautions at the same time that its "frenetic fury" will weary the reader, who should then seek calm, sanity, strength, and refreshment in the more reliable writings of Walt Whitman and Joseph Dietzgen.

The socialist ardor for Nietzsche was not broken by the outbreak of the war, when the philosopher was castigated by many in the West for propagating militarism and animosity among nations. Max Eastman is exemplary for leftist thinkers who defended Nietzsche against assaults during the war years. Eastman points out that far from advocating nationalism, Nietzsche defended a cosmopolitan attitude that often involved a European perspective. Unfortunate in the attacks against Nietzsche is that his detractors ignore that he wrote many things that people ought to hear (703). Chief among them are his thoughts on morality. Eastman appreciates especially his criticism of Christianity and religious hypocrisy. In place of the Christian ideals and morality he rejected Nietzsche offers the superman, who is characterized by "self-control, intellect, action, discipline, and eternal sacrifice for posterity." Although he recognizes that Nietzsche believed his supermen could only come into being as the result of the enslavement of the mass of society, and that Nietzsche therefore promulgated an order divided into an elite, leisure class and a mass that supports that elite, Eastman contends that Nietzsche's error was to consider today's society as the basis for his vision. Nietzsche's description of the superman indicates that he was instinctively on the right track since it matches more closely the ranks of the United Mine Workers of America than the Union League Club, Eastman contends, reminding his reader that there is nothing super or noble about the elite in our society aside from their possessions. Nietzsche is valuable, therefore, not because he was a proto-socialist, but because he almost got it almost right.

Had Nietzsche been a little less of the hermit and a little less perhaps of the snob, he would have been wiser. He would have realized that the contest must be made equal and "free for all," if those truly "fittest" are to survive. In short, he would have grasped a greater ideal -- the ideal of the Super-Society, in which all men are free, and those born with heroic and great gifts or characters must inevitably rise to eminence, through their sheer value to mankind. (704)

Those who do not interpret him simplistically recognize that he advocated ultimately the type of individual who would emerge from the revolutionary overcoming of the capitalist order. If Nietzsche advocated war, therefore, it was not a war of imperialism, such as the Germans were conducting, but rather a war "in the interest of truth and ideas" (704), and thus one that matches the fundamental goals of true socialists.
Nietzsche's popularity among the socialists was surpassed only by the admiration showered on him by American anarchists. One reason that the anarchist connection with Nietzsche received more prominent mention was simply because there are several thematic connections between Nietzsche and the anarchist tradition, especially the German tradition associated with Max Stirner. Even during Nietzsche's lifetime there was some speculation that he had been influenced by the author of *The Ego and Its Own* (1845). Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth, who had a proprietary interest in maintaining her brother's originality, and who certainly did not desire his works placed in the circle of left-Hegelian individualism, maintained that he had never read Stirner. Franz Overbeck, however, who was Nietzsche's closest associated during his Basel years, and who was actively engaged in a dispute with Elisabeth over her brother's legacy, asserts the contrary and estimates that the influence was considerable. Curiously we find no reference to Stirner in any of Nietzsche's writings or notebooks; nor does his name appear in his correspondence, and several of his closest acquaintances, when queried by Elisabeth, stated the Nietzsche had never mentioned Stirner. No matter what Nietzsche might have thought of Stirner, and even if he was familiar with his book, he harbored mixed feelings about anarchism as a school of thought. In his initial years Nietzsche was attracted by the etymology of the term: he initially values the notion of lawlessness and acting without a leader or guide, and he writes in his notebook as late as 1880: "der höchste Grad von Individualität wird erreicht, wenn jemand in der höchsten Anarachie sein Reich gründet als Einsiedler" (KGW 5.1: 539, the highest degree of individualism is attained when someone establishes in the highest anarchy his kingdom as a hermit"). From the mid 1880s onward, however, the notion of anarchism becomes one of his favorite targets and is associated variously with everything he disdains: pessimism, free-thinking, weakness of the will, moralism, emancipation, pessimism, nihilism, socialism, democracy, anti-Semitism, and Christianity. In a typical selection from his notebooks, he writes: "Ich bin ganz abgeneigt 1) dem Socialismus, weil er ganz naiv vom Heerden-Blödsinn des ‘Guten Wahren Schön en' und von gleichen Rechten träumt: auch der Anarchismus will, nur auf brutalere Weise, das gleiche Ideal" (KGW 7.3: 200, I am disinclined toward (1) socialism, because it dreams naively about the herd-stupidity of the "good true beautiful" about equal rights; anarchism also wants the same ideal, only in a more brutal fashion). By the time we reach *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche is speaking of "der Anarchisten-Hunde, welche jetzt durch die Gassen der europäischen Cultur schweifen" (KGW 6.2: 126, anarchist dogs who now roam the allies of European culture), and in one of his final notebooks he associates anarchists as the lowest point, the swamp of European culture (KGW 8.3: 335).

Derogatory references, which were obvious in published as well as unpublished materials, did not deter American anarchists from recruiting Nietzsche as one of their most redoutable precursors. One anarchist journal from San Francisco, *The Blast*, raffled off a complete twenty-volume set of the English translation of Nietzsche, "the great philosopher and poet," at twenty-five cents per ticket. Indeed, translations of Nietzsche's writings in the United States very likely appeared first in *Liberty*, the anarchist journal edited by Benjamin Tucker. Undertaken by George Schumm, selections from Nietzsche's writings, such as *Human All Too Human* and *Beyond Good and Evil*, appeared throughout the 1890s in an obvious attempt to claim Nietzsche for the anarchist cause. As early as 1893 Tucker himself mentions the necessity of making "Nietzsche's works
available to all" along with those of other great thinkers who have contributed to anarchism. In later issues of the journal Nietzsche is hailed together with Stirner as "two of the greatest teachers of individualism," and Nietzsche is called, in a positive sense, "the great egoist philosopher." Of particular interest to Tucker and like-minded anarchists were Nietzsche's remarks about the state and its detrimental function. Selections from Human All Too Human dealing with the state therefore provided anarchists with a number of citations with which they could identify, from the claim in aphorism 235 that true genius is incompatible with the ideal state (KGW 4.2: 200), to aphorism 473, which ends with the call for "so wenig Staat wie möglich" (KGW 4.2: 318, as little state as possible). Tucker was not oblivious to Nietzsche's faults and eventually recognized that his teachings were often in tension with his own and those of the anarchist movement. As early as 1897 he questions the uncritical adoption of Nietzsche in the English publication The Eagle and the Serpent, since Nietzsche endorsed hierarchy and opposed equal liberty. Tucker preferred the strategy of exploiting his writings, but proceeding with due caution: "Nietzsche says splendid things, -- often, indeed, Anarchist things, -- but he is no Anarchist. It is of the Anarchists, then, to intellectually exploit this would-be exploiter. He may be utilized profitably, but not prophetably."

Other anarchists comment in a similar fashion. In an anonymous article published in Freeland in June of 1904, the author confirms Tucker's observation that Nietzsche should not be regarded as an anarchist, but lauds his "contempt and disgust for the State," citing an especially suggestive passage from Zarathustra: "Whatever the State speaks is falsehood, and whatever it possesses it has stolen. Everything is counterfeit in it. The biting monster -- it bites with stolen teeth. Its very bowels are counterfeit." This author, however, venerates Nietzsche more for his views on morality than for his comments on government. Nietzsche has caused a "universal commotion among the students of ethics" owing to "baldly and clearly stated" arguments against Christianity and accepted systems of morality. In this regard he is a genuine revolutionary. But he is also the sober and reflective academic who employs "cold and philosophical reasoning" and utilizes the "facts of history and facts of natural science" to formulate his critique of previous ethical thought. What makes his ethics attractive for anarchists is his preference for the individual over the collectivity, and this feature has incurred the enmity of many contemporaries indebted to collectivist notions of the good. "'Human brotherhood', we read, 'was as abhorrent to Nietzsche as was the supernaturalism of theologists.'

Nietzsche's rational ethics bring him into the proximity of another commanding German individualist, Max Stirner, who evinces impulses and emotions identical to Nietzsche's. Placed in the same circle of iconoclastic thinkers are Proudhon in France, Ibsen in Norway, Spencer in England, and Thoreau, Emerson, and Walt Whitman in the United States. Included also among this group of notables are Richard Wagner and Richard Strauss, "who have taken positions far in advance of their contemporaries," and who have been moved "by the same general impulse of progress that has manifested itself in other branches of human thought." Although the author notes Nietzsche's disagreements with Wagner, as well as the fact that Wagner's later writing was "to a certain extent reactionary," he sees in the character of Siegfried an embodiment of Nietzsche's "overman." Nietzsche's ill fit with anarchism can be glossed over ultimately because he despised "cant and hypocrisy"; his ideals were "courage, strength, and honesty," and these values are ones to which all anarchists likewise aspire.
Perhaps no anarchist journal was more favorably disposed toward Nietzsche than Emma Goldman's *Mother Earth*. Selections from *The Antichrist*, from *Twilight of the Idols*, from *Daybreak*, and from *Zarathustra* can be found in the journal from 1906-1914. A poem from Nietzsche's literary remains, given the title "Among Enemies," graces the title page of the June, 1907 issue. When war was declared and Nietzsche was recruited in Germany for the propaganda effort, and held responsible in the United States for the outbreak of hostilities, *Mother Earth* defended his anti-war credentials with an excerpt from the first *Untimely Meditation* concerning David Strauss's book *The Old and the New Beliefs*. Nietzsche speaks here against extolling war and celebrating victory, although his remarks must be understood in context: His criticism was not directed against Germany's military engagement with France, but against the failure of the victory to usher in a cultural renaissance. For *Mother Earth*, however, Nietzsche, "the great poet-philosopher," was fashioned as "a bitter opponent of war who saw clearly the distinction between the spirit of culture and the spirit of empire." In 1913, an author identified as B.M. (probably Max Baginski) extolls Nietzsche for combining "the artistic temperament with the scientific spirit." The moving spirit behind *Mother Earth* and the most noted anarchist of the times, Emma Goldman, encouraged this enthusiasm for Nietzsche. She probably became acquainted with his works as early as 1895, when she was in Vienna, and his thoughts crops up frequently in her works during the next few decades. In a tribute to Peter Kropotkin on his seventieth birthday, for example, she mentions Nietzsche as someone who "hated organized authority as the most ruthless and barbaric institution among men." Goldman was particularly impressed by Nietzsche's notion of a transvaluation of values, which corresponded well with her own political program of change. In an article from 1913 she cites Nietzsche and Stirner as "two intellectual giants, who have undertaken to transvalue the dead social and moral values of the past, especially those contained in Christianity." Nietzsche's opposition to slave morality, and his analysis of Christianity as a denial of life outweigh his apparent advocacy of a "master morality for the privileged few," since Goldman believes that his "master idea" has nothing to do with "the vulgarity of station, caste, or wealth," but rather with "the masterful in human possibilities, the masterful in man that would help him to overcome old traditions and worn-out values, so that he may learn to become the creator of new and beautiful things." Accordingly Nietzsche did not posit the overman because he was "a hater of the weak"; rather, that "giant mind" employed the superman as an indicator for a social order that "will not give birth to a race of weaklings and slaves." When Nietzsche was attacked as a cause of the First World War, Goldman defended him, and on her lecture tours in the years prior to her deportation she frequently spoke on Nietzsche. For Goldman, as for other anarchists, Nietzsche was exemplary for a thinker who stood outside of the religious, moral, and artistic conventions of the time, and who agitated for a radical alteration of the status quo. His own elitism and opposition to anarchism could thus be overlooked because of his fierce opposition to the state as authority, his virulent anti-Christianity, and his vehement rejection of restrictive moral dogma.

Goldman had to ignore more than Nietzsche's attacks on socialism and anarchism. As an early champion of women's rights, she also had to disregard his remarks on women, feminism, and the movement for women's emancipation. With respect to this cluster of issues, Nietzsche evidences more potential liabilities than in his stated views on left-wing political groups. The small piece of wisdom Zarathustra received from the little
old woman -- "Du gehst zu Frauen? Vergiss die Peitsche nicht! (KGW 4.1: 82, You are going to women? Do not forget the whip!) -- may be the most notorious misogynist apothegm in Nietzsche's works, but it was certainly not an isolated instance of his scorn for women and women's rights. Although Nietzsche's remarks on women during the 1870s were fairly benign, usually consisting of attempts at witty bon mots or observations on life, during the 1880s his comments become bitter and malevolent. Women are often reduced to their biological function as mothers, or to their social function as wives. "Alles am Weibe ist ein Räthsel, Zarathustra informs his readers, "und Alles am Weibe hat Eine Lösung: sie heisst Schwangerschaft" (KGW 4.1: 81, Everything about woman is a riddle and everything about woman has one solution: that is pregnancy). Later he maintains: "Das Glück des Mannes heisst: ich will. Das Glück des Weibes heisst: er will" (KGW 4.1: 81, The happiness of man is: I will. The happiness of woman is: he wills). In light of these allegedly intrinsic female traits, it is not surprising that Nietzsche registers the movement for women's emancipation as an affront to common sense and to the natural order. Their attempts to achieve an education comparable to a man's are ludicrous and misdirected. In his view, if women really established "female scientific thinking" (der weiblichen Wissenschaftlichkeit) it would reveal only "im Weibe ist so viel Pedantisches, Oberflächliches, Schulmeisterliches, Kleinlich-Zügelloses und -Unbescheidenes versteckt" (KGW 6.2: 177, in women there is so much that is pedantic, superficial, carping, pettily presumptuous, pettily unbridled, and immodest). Women who insist on equal rights are those who "have turned out ill" (des missrathenen) who are "incapable of bearing " (gebärunüchtigen), "die verunglückten Weiblein . . ., die 'Emancipirten', denen das Zeug zu Kindern abgeht" (KGW 6.3: 303-04, the abortive women, the 'emancipated' who lack the stuff for children). His views of feminism thus correspond very closely to his opinions on socialists and anarchists: each of these groups seeks to change society via emancipation, attempting to break down hierarchies and extend rights and privileges formerly held by an exclusive group to a broader segment of the population.

Women on the left were more than willing to overlook his transgressions. Emma Goldman herself never mentions his most offensive remarks on women, and everything she published seems intended to gloss over his most misogynist pronouncements. Included in the March 1907 issue of Mother Earth, for example, is an essay by Helene Stoecker, a prominent member of the German women's movement known for her positions on sexual and social reform. In Goldman's journal she contributes a piece on "The Newer Ethics," dealing exclusively with Nietzsche's philosophy. Zarathustra is the emblem of newer ethics, since he endorses a healthier attitude toward sexuality and morals. Stoecker's views on Nietzsche are somewhat unusual and clash in important areas with Goldman's and with other anarchists: she considers Nietzsche's teachings to be a continuation and development of Christianity, not a rejection of it, and she remarks at one point that his philosophy "is identical with certain underlying principles of Christianity" (18). Nietzsche advances beyond religious doctrine in his advocacy of a freer sexual life. "To Nietzsche," she writes, "as to the Greeks, sex was symbolic of all the inner and deeper meaning of ancient piety, and everything pertaining to the procreative act, pregnancy and birth, awakened only the highest and purest emotions" (18). Stoecker is extremely short on evidence, but she is for that reason even more expansive in her claims. Nietzsche not only endorsed sexual liberation; he also supported childhood education in sexual matters: "Nietzsche was one of the first to satisfy our moral feelings upon the sex
question, in relation to children. He realized the danger of letting the latter grow up in entire ignorance of the most vital subject, and of allowing women to marry without the least preparation for, or realization of the meaning of, the most important questions of life" (20). Nietzsche believed, we are told, that women "should be treated with the greatest gentleness": his very idea of love was founded on the feminine (20). In Stoecker’s presentation Nietzsche also becomes an incisive critic of contemporary marriage, as well as an earnest exponent of reform. "Nothing seemed to Nietzsche more despicable or more detrimental to the interests of the race than marriage for money or position. That children of such origin are apt to be worthless is easily realized" (22). For Stoecker, and for the readers of Mother Earth, Nietzsche is likely to be regarded as a contributor to enlightened thought about women, a writer who, like Stoecker herself, was concerned with their liberation as well as the institutions that kept them in a subservient social position.

Not all women subscribed to this view. Louise Willcox, for example, concedes that Nietzsche wrote a great deal on women and marriage, but adds that "most of it is unpardonably stupid" and "self-contradictory." She does give him credit, however, for writing: "Das vollkommene Weib ist ein höherer Typus des Menschen, als der vollkommenen Mann: auch etwas viel Selteneres" (KGW 4.2: 273, The perfect woman is a higher type than the perfect man and much rarer"), a pronouncement several other women found attractive in Nietzsche's thought. The anonymous author of the article "Did Nietzsche Predict the Superwoman as well as the Superman?", cites the same passage from Human, All Too Human, arguing that Nietzsche can be viewed as advocating a more highly developed type of woman. Nietzsche is depicted as a defender of sexual emancipation and carnal love, and a thinker who revered marriage as a passionate union of man and woman. Since women are necessary for the perfect marriage, as well as to breed the "transfigured man of the future," the author concludes that Nietzsche must have foreseen and welcomed the Superwoman. Anna Strunsky Walling, a left-wing socialist who had emigrated from Russia in the early part of the century, defends Nietzsche with similar arguments. Her claim is that Nietzsche is often read superficially and therefore misunderstood. Recalling the notorious maxim about the whip from Zarathustra, she laments that because of this remark Nietzsche has been written off as a misogynist. "Instead," she assures her readers in the New Review, "he loved and revered women." Accounting for the reference to the whip as "simply an echo of a scene in Turgeniev," she explains further that it "refers to the known fact that there are women that have borne with brutality and have even at times invited it." Nietzsche, however, is not "more hostile to the feminist movement than Ellen Key," the noted Swedish author and Nietzsche enthusiast who believed women were destined by biology for motherhood and not for equality in the labor market. For Walling Key "glories in the awakening of woman," and Nietzsche, like her, extolls woman for their "beauty of character, idealism, and faith." While she grants that he did not recognize an ideal of democracy that would have accorded equal rights to men and women, and admits further that he was not always able to extract himself from traditional feelings, she claims that he "loved love," "believed in romance," and was "drawn deeply to women." His preference for free spirits to live alone and not marry is attributed to his rejection of the burden of "winning bread, security, and social position for wife and children." For Walling Nietzsche is the valiant debunker of morality, the church, and "all the ethics of expediency with which the lowly and the meek
have been swathed." As in the writings of other progressives, his disparaging remarks about women are either refuted, ignored, or reinterpreted to make him a champion, or at least a dependable ally, of feminism.

The reception of Nietzsche by Isadora Duncan demonstrates another manner in which the philosopher became the inspiration for leftist women. Duncan is well known for liberating ballet from its conventions and ushering in the freer forms of modern expressive dance. Her social thought was as iconoclastic as her theory of dance: she was opposed to marriage and an advocate of women's rights. In her political views she stood closest to socialists and other leftist thinkers of her era. And, like many fellow feminists and leftists, she was an enthusiastic reader of Nietzsche. She evidently became acquainted with his works in 1902, while she was in Berlin, and it is said that a copy of *Zarathustra* remained always at her bedside. In her autobiography she describes her introduction to Nietzsche by Karl Federn, who claimed that she would "come to the full revelation of dancing expression" only after acquaintance with his writings. He read to her each morning in German from *Zarathustra* and for Duncan the experience was exhilarating: "The seduction of Nietzsche's philosophy ravished my being, and those hours which Karl Federn devoted to me each day assumed a fascination so potent that it was with the greatest reluctance that my Impresario could persuade me to make even short tours to Hamburg, Hanover, Leipsic, etc." Indeed, Duncan reports that in Europe she had three great Masters, who were the "three great precursors of the Dance of our century -- Beethoven, Nietzsche, and Wagner. Beethoven created the Dance in mighty rhythm, Wagner in sculptural form, Nietzsche in Spirit. Nietzsche was the first dancing philosopher" (341). So inspirational was Nietzsche for Duncan that she includes a passage in which Zarathustra extolls dance (KGW, 6.1: 283) as the motto for her autobiography. *Zarathustra* was also influential for Duncan's seminal essay on "The Dance of the Future," but the most important work by Nietzsche for her was probably *The Birth of Tragedy*. Duncan repeatedly calls upon the Dionysian to elucidate her revolution in dancing, and she reminds her reader in *The Art of Dance* that Nietzsche signed his last message "Dionysus Crucified" (140). There are, Duncan writes in this collection mixing theoretical and lyrical prose, only two possible modes of expression: "One can throw oneself into the spirit of the dance, and dance the thing itself: Dionysus. Or one can contemplate the spirit of the dance -- and dance as one who relates a story Apollo" (140). For her, and for other women seeking emancipation from social and artistic constraints, Nietzsche represented liberation of body and spirit.

Nietzsche's favorable appraisal in the United States among groups that he repudiates could be attributed to the unique situation on this side of the Atlantic, except that it duplicates his reception in Europe as well, in particular in his native country. While Nietzsche was largely ignored in Germany during the 1870s and 1880s, beginning around 1890 we begin to encounter a similar affirmative reaction on the parts of leftists and feminists. Although orthodox socialists spurned Nietzsche as an outgrowth of aggressive capitalism, leftists who were more bohemian and less dogmatic, as well as those oppositional groups that tended toward anarchism, considered him by and large an ally in their struggles against the status quo. Several prominent leaders of the German women's movement similarly embraced Nietzsche, so much so that Steven Aschheim can even write of a "feminist Nietzscheanism" (87). Thus Nietzsche's direct repudiation of leftist and feminist views obviously did not dissuade disciples in the US or in Germany from
viewing him in a positive light. One factor that assists us in making sense of this paradoxical situation was Nietzsche's attack on ideologies and institutions of the middle-class establishment. His unmasking of morality as a set of values bound to a particular set of circumstances, and not universal in nature; his critique of religion, and in particular the Judeo-Christian heritage, for propagating an anti-natural regime depriving individuals of freedom and causing them to deteriorate into sickness and debility; his penchant for appreciating art and beauty, for validating the realm of the aesthetic, in contrast to the utility and monotony associated in the minds of many leftists with the capitalist mode of production; his rejection of parliamentary politics and the state as institutions that are ineffective for governing, damaging to individual liberty, and antithetical to the production of genius; these features of his thought enhanced his reputation among groups marginalized in bourgeois society and outweighed Nietzsche's direct and often truculent criticism of socialists, anarchists, and feminists. Another factor was Nietzsche's rhetoric, which conveys a revolutionary subtext even when the content of his statement is reactionary. Nietzsche's style is suggestive for anyone who is in revolt against the existing order and seeking to overturn an established state of affairs. The revaluation of values, the superman, and the Dionysian impart to readers an exhilarating feeling of struggle and a utopian vision of heroic proportions. Finally, Nietzsche's aphoristic style allows readers to select those passages that are favorable, and to ignore or neglect those that come into conflict with their convictions. In the leftist and feminist reception we often find similar or even identical passages cited, while Nietzsche's condemnations are passed over in silence.

The lesson we may be tempted to draw from the early American reception of Nietzsche is that he was the philosopher of illocutionary force. I do not mean, of course, that he wrote about speech acts as Austin did, but rather than his own writing, because of the reasons previously cited, contains a force beyond or beside the specific messages found in the text, and often cancelling the declarative statements in the text. The history of Nietzsche's political reception can thus be conceived as a succession of different subtexts coming to the fore, and then receding to make way for another, equally contradictory interpretation. The early Nietzscheans of the left, however, present a particular difficulty for those, like myself, who advocate historicization and contextualization. By placing Nietzsche in dialogue with his contemporaries, and by evaluating his discourse in the context of his own epoch, I would contend that we can achieve a better understanding of what Nietzsche really meant. It is thus sobering and a bit disturbing to recognize that rather consistently those who were closest to him temporally, those who shared many of the identical concerns and were familiar with a similar spectrum of knowledge, frequently understood him in ways that appear to be directly contrary to what he was espousing. At a time when socialists, anarchists, and feminists all clamored for equality, for the destruction of special privileges, and for the extension of rights to the disenfranchised and subaltern sectors of society, Nietzsche opposed these views from a perspective that often appears to be reactionary even for his own times. Nietzsche also rejected the morality and religion of the establishment, but he appears to do so because he was convinced that this morality and religion would lead seamlessly to the implementation of leftist and feminist demands that were beginning to gain currency. For him socialism, anarchism, and feminism were not antagonistic to Christianity and a morality of weakness; they were their natural and pernicious
consequences. Yet the adherents to these movements, when confronted with Nietzsche's thought, manage to overlook the context and logic of Nietzsche's arguments and accept him as a kindred spirit. The real lesson of Nietzsche's early American reception may thus be identical to what we learn from much of the history of Nietzsche exegesis in general: the transformative power of interpreters dedicated to a cause. For the true believers examining Nietzsche, illocution trumps locution, sub-texts supercede declarative statements, rhetorical gestures carry more weight than substance and meaning. The American socialists, anarchists, and feminists who lauded Nietzsche were fervid advocates of change in our society, but their tendentious readings ultimately tell us much more about their own passions than those of the German philosopher they exalt.
Notes

. Max Nordau, Degeneration (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1993).
. The first volume in this series, published in 1905, was Wilhelm Boelsche's The Evolution of Man.
. "Was Nietzsche a Madman or a Genius?" Current Literature 43 (1908): 642.


The translation is rather loose: "Aber der Staat lügt in allen Zungen des Guten und Bösen; und was er auch redet, er lügt — und was er auch hat, gestohlen hat er's. Falsch ist alles an ihm; mit gestohlenen Zähnen beisst er, der Bissige. Falsch sind selbst seine Eingeweide." (KGW 6.1: 57, But the state lies in all the tongues of good and evil; and whatever it says it lies -- and whatever it has it has stolen. Everything about it is false; it bites with stolen teeth, and bites easily. Even its entrails are false.) One can also take exception to Kaufmann's translation, especially the translation of "der Bissige" as "and bites easily." Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1968), 161.


*Mother Earth* 9 (October 1914): 260.

B. M., "Friedrich Nietzsche," *Mother Earth* 7 (January 1913): 383


For information on Nietzsche and the anarchist tradition, in particular, his reception by Emma Goldman, I am indebted to Barry Pateman and Candace Faulk of the Emma Goldman Papers Project on the Berkeley campus.


Willcox, p. 771.

Anon., "Did Nietzsche Predict the Superwoman As Well As the Superman?" *Current Literature* 43 (Dec. 1907), 643-44.


See Drimmer, p. 195; and Aschheim, p. 61.
