Macedonian Anarchist History

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[edit] The St Elijah's Day Uprising in Macedonia

The St Elijah's Day (Ilinden) uprising of 1903 is of prime significance in the history of the revolutionary movement in Macedonia, be it in terms of the number of participants, its duration and its level of organization, or be it in terms of its repercussions in the Ottoman empire and beyond. As such it deserves greater attention in the history of the anti-Ottoman liberation struggles in Macedonia and Thrace.

This presentation of the events and their background does not pretend to be a complete study of the revolutionary movement of the time. Many authors have written about the St Elijah's Day uprising and it has been well studied. But interest in the revolutionary events of 1903 has been focussed almost exclusively on the St Elijah's Day uprising - it is often forgotten that the uprising in Thrace at Transfiguration (Preobrazheniye) was inseparably connected with the uprising in Macedonia since it was launched in solidarity with the uprising in Macedonia and with the full agreement of the movement's leadership.

Because of this deficit more attention is given here to the Transfiguration uprising. Our aim is to show and to further study the involvement of anarchists in the revolutionary movement. The Transfiguration uprising, whose main leader was the anarchist Mikhail Gerdzhikov, provides a fuller and more accurate picture of the libertarian spirit of the movement as a whole.

When dealing with an uprising or a revolution it is not correct to only view the period of decisive struggles between the antagonistic forces. Every revolution and every uprising is preceded by a range of interconnected developments. This calls for a comprehensive study of the entire pre-revolutionary period, of all the events and preconditions which gave rise to the revolution or uprising. This cannot be done here in full scholarly depth because, as mentioned, we have set ourselves other goals.

Let me begin with the events on the eve of the uprising. At the congress of the revolutionary movement of the Bitola region of Macedonia held in the village of Smilovo the decision was taken to launch a limited-scale uprising based on guerilla tactics - the idea of a full-scale popular insurrection was rejected. The congress was a truly democratic gathering. 32 delegates were present at the start, and their number increased to 50 by the end of the congress. The first point of the agenda was hearing and discussing reports from different districts of Macedonia on the state of preparations for an uprising. The majority of delegates was against launching a fully-fledged uprising because, in their view, the people were not prepared. Damyan Gruyev, who chaired the congress, declared the question of the uprising to have been resolved affirmatively and proceeded to the next point of the agenda - that of practical preparations for the limited form of uprising chosen. As the delegates were of the view that a streamlined, well-functioning organization had not yet been constructed and the population was not yet well armed enough to launch a full-scale uprising, it was decided that guerilla tactics should be used. Militias were formed in the regions where the uprising was to take place and were to operate according to a plan elaborated in advance without the involvement of the civilian population. For larger-scale operations the militias were to be capable of dividing up into smaller units; this would also make it easier for them to be supplied with food and to go underground. In each of the revolutionary movement's operational regions power was vested in a so-called "Rebel Command", the leadership of the militia. Coordination offices were set up in the towns and cities for information exchange and to facilitate better organization and supply. Regions were divided into sub-regions. Rebels who were junior and senior army officers were appointed by the congress to give military instruction to the rebel coordinators in each region. A "Disciplinary Statute of the Uprising" was elaborated by Boris Sarafov, an officer of the reserve, and Nikola Dechev, a junior reserve officer. The congress elected a General Staff comprising Damyan Gruyev, Boris Sarafov and A. Lozanchev - with G. Popkhristov, P. Atsev and L. Poptraykov as deputies if required - which was to guide the preparations for the uprising and lead the uprising itself. In agreement with the Central Committee the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) and with other regions the General Staff was also given the task of setting the date for the uprising under the condition that it not be before mid July so that adequate preparations be made and food supplies stockpiled.

Immediately after the Smilovo congress Gruyev and Sarafov went on a tour of inspection of the Bitola region with a their so-called staff unit of 20 men commanded by Dechev. They went from the Ohrid district to the Resen, Kostur and Demikhasar districts, resolving local conflicts and misunderstandings, and appointed people in charge of ensuring adequate organization of the rebels and securing supplies of weapons, food, salt, medicines and other essentials.

It should be emphasized that a large proportion of the guns and other military equipment used during the uprising were got from the Turks, mainly taken from Turkish army storehouses and barracks. Military preparations for the uprising were so involved that the rebels even conducted maneuvers among themselves with two "sides", one led by Dechev and the other by Stoykov, a lieutenant of the reserve.

The original intention had been to launch the uprising in the spring of 1903, but at a meeting of revolutionary activists in Sofia in January of that year it had became clear that it would have to be postponed. When the next congress took place at Petrova Niva from 28th-30th June 1903 it was clear that the precise date of the uprising in Macedonia would be 10th July. Since the revolutionary movement in the Odrin region of Thrace*1 was still not ready for the uprising, Gerdzhikov was delegated by telegraph to request a postponement of the beginning of the uprising to August, which was accepted.

In agreement with the Central Committee of the IMRO and the exile office in Sofia the General Staff in Macedonia laid down the date of the uprising to be 20th July (in the old Julian calendar: 2nd August) - the religious festival of St Elijah, which was to give its name to the uprising. The decision was communicated to the people on 15th July and sent out to the revolutionary movement in all districts. The secret was kept successfully until the very last moment and when the uprising broke out the Turkish authorities were taken by surprise.

The Central Committee of the IMRO issued a declaration circulated widely by its representatives abroad explaining its actions to the Great Powers and to the Bulgarian and foreign press: "The unrestrained violence of the Mohammedans and the systematic oppression by the authorities have driven the Christian population of Macedonian and Thrace to resort to armed self-defense. All peaceful means of conflict resolution have been exhausted. We call on the rest of Europe to intervene by way of negotiations in order to resolve the status of the population of Macedonia and Thrace... The IMRO rejects all responsibility for the uprising and declares that it will support the popular struggle until its aims have finally been achieved. We are aware of our duty and this gives us strength, as it does to know that we enjoy the sympathy of the civilized world."*2

In its declaration the General Staff emphasized: "We are taking up arms against tyranny and inhumanity; we are fighting for freedom and humanity; our cause is thus higher than any national or ethnic differences. Therefore we express our solidarity with all others who suffer in the Sultan's dark Empire. Today it is not only the whole Christian population which suffers, but ordinary Turkish villagers as well. Our only enemies are the Turkish authorities, those who use arms against us, betray us, or who carry out acts of retaliation against helpless old people, women and children rather than against us, the rebels. We will fight these enemies and avenge all wrongs!..."*3

On the day of the uprising the members of the General Staff met up in the hills high above Smilovo with the local rebels. Before all of those gathered there - peasants and artisans, teachers and officers - the village priest blessed the red flag. Towards evening bells were rung and bales of hay set ablaze to signal the start of the uprising. After three days of fighting and a siege from 23rd July, Smilovo was taken by the rebels and converted into an armed base. The population of about 2,000 moved up into the nearby hills and built huts, set up kitchens and made itself ovens. Food supplies and medical services were organized. The entire population renounced private property.

In the Bitola area, where the revolutionary movement was numerically strongest, best organized and best armed, seven different locations were targeted in the first night of the uprising and in the days that followed. Attacks were launched on barracks and police stations, bridges on the main road from Bitola to Resen were blown up, telegraph lines were cut, and all the Governor's towers were set on fire. The rebels' tactics were closely linked to the endeavour to not endanger the civilian population and to make economical use of weapons. At this stage of the uprising casualties were mainly among the Turks.

The uprising was most successful in Krushevo - a town with a mixed population of Bulgarians*4, Greeks and Aromanians*5. In the night of the 20th July and the early hours of the 21st July the town was surrounded and attacked by 800 rebels. It fell quickly. The bells of the town's three churches rang as Turkish resistance was mopped up, and at daybreak only 60 Turkish troops still offered resistance, surrounded in the barracks. Government institutions were taken over and the people of the town were in a mood of exultation. "God bless our freedom!" they cried jubilantly.

On 22nd and 23rd a detachment of Turkish troops and bashi-bazouks made an unsuccessful attempt to retake Krushevo. On 22nd July the "Rebel Command" headed by the Socialist and school teacher Nikola Karev descended from the hills into the town and held a meeting with influential town figures - about 60 in total - including representatives of all three ethnic groups. A six-member commission was elected comprised of two Bulgarians, Aromanians and Greeks respectively. This was a "Provisional Government" entrusted with the administration of the free city. Six departments were set up: a judiciary, a requisitions section, an administration of finances, a police force, a food supply organization and a medical service, and their operations were the responsibility of the members of the Provisional Government. A hospital was set up in the Bulgarian school and an Aromanian doctor put in charge. The saddler's workshops in the town promptly began producing peasant shoes, cartridge belts and rifle slings. A small foundry was set up for making bullets and repairing rifles and revolvers. Two mills worked around the clock to grind wheat brought from granaries and storehouses in the mountains, which was then distributed to the population and the rebels.

The "Government" looked after the families of the former Ottoman officials, giving them separate houses and supplies of food. An appeal was sent to the Muslim villages in the vicinity, requesting them to remain neutral and stay calm. It stressed that the rebels' struggle was "for the liberation of all Macedonians regardless of nationality and faith".

Special festive services were celebrated in all three churches - Bulgarian, Greek and Aromanian. Among those who attended were members of the "Provisional Government" and the General Staff.

The same day the revolutionary court passed the death sentence on five traitors - one Bulgarian and four Greeks.

The "Krushevo Republic" was explicitly socialist in character. There was a spirit of mutual understanding between the different ethnic groups, and effective administration ensured fairness and the safety of the population while at the same time allowing full freedom. But the sun of freedom was only to shine for 10 days.

In the Demirkhisar area there were around 1,000 organized rebels. Their tasks involved burning down the Governor's towers, attacking Turkish garrisons and destroying or interrupting lines of communication. In a victorious march they took many villages and everywhere proclaimed the liberation of the enslaved population. Four of the villages which were considered safest were chosen as food supply centres - foodstuffs were put into storage there and food was prepared for the rebels and the population. Empty cartridges were refilled with gunpowder and clothing was sewn for the rebels. Detachments of men and women went from the hills down into the valleys to collect the harvest in the fields. After numerous but scattered clashes with Turkish forces a ceasefire began on 22nd July, lasting until 5th August. Contacts were established with mixed and Turkish villages and agreements were reached on mutual non-aggression.

In the Kostur area the news of the planned uprising arrived very late and spread slowly. Although it took some time for the uprising to start, it was here that it erupted on the largest scale of all. In the northern parts of the area the entire population rose up. The local rebel command took the initiative - it secured victory in the area by delivering a series of hard, decisive blows with lightning speed. The town of Klisura was in rebel hands from 23rd July to 14th August - a total of 20 days.

In the Lerin area preparations for the uprising were least adequate. There were around 500 organized rebels in this area, about 10-20 per village, and here the decision of the congress to conduct a guerilla-type uprising was carried out most faithfully. The population remained in the villages and the uprising was limited to various acts of sabotage in the first night: the telegraph lines between Lerin and Bitola were cut, road and railway bridges were destroyed, and governor's towers on the estates were set on fire. But precautionary repression by the authorities was to crush the uprising here - a hard-felt defeat.

In the Ohrid area the results of the uprising were most disappointing. On the one hand the natural inclination of the population and their resolve was favourable for an uprising. But on the other hand the proximity to Albania - which looked unfavourably upon the Macedonians - the small proportion of Bulgarians in the population in outlying areas, and the rebels' very poor level of armament discouraged the revolutionary leaders in Ohrid. The tasks agreed to under the general plan were fulfilled, but no significant military successes were achieved. When the sun rose on St Elijah's Day the town was dotted with posters in Turkish calling on the Turkish population to remain neutral and explaining that the revolutionary struggle was not directed against it but rather against the tyranny of Ottoman rule. This helped calm the Turkish population which was very fearful of developments. The chief administrator of the area showed tolerance towards the Bulgarians and at the same time kept a tight rein on the fanatical Turkish nationalists. Thus the situation in the town remained relatively calm, but at the same time the revolutionary enthusiasm of the local revolutionary leaders in Ohrid was dampened. Acts of brutality were committed in outlying areas, which together with errors committed by the leadership limited the scale and success of the uprising. Communication lines between Ohrid and Bitola, Kichevo, Debar, Elbasan and Korcha were cut, governor's towers were set on fire, and governors, town criers and Turkish officials were caught and beaten up in the villages. In purely militarily terms the rebels were fairly well prepared - there were involved in quite a number of small armed clashes and suffered no significant casualties.

In the Kichevo area only the population of the mountainous areas participated in the uprising. The other areas were very much under the influence of Serbian propaganda and the population remained passive. Along with acts of sabotage in Kichevo there was also a large demonstration. On 20th July the city was surrounded by three rebel detachments of altogether around 500 men. With loud shouts of "hurrah" and shooting flares they sowed panic and disorder in the ranks of the Turkish troops who were encamped just out of town. Half an hour later, realizing that they were not numerous enough or sufficiently well armed to take the town, the rebels withdrew into the mountains. Their demonstrative action had succeeded in spreading fear in the Turkish-held town.

In most of the clashes in these first days of the uprising the rebels gained short-term successes due to their great mobility and the element of surprise. They operated not in small dispersed militias but in much larger units, and were nevertheless deployed with whirlwind speed.

There was no uprising in the Prilep area. This was due to its distance both from the Bulgarian border and from the provinces where supplies of weapons were largely obtained. In his study of the uprising Khristo Silyanov also identifies the behaviour of the great revolutionaries Dzhordzhe Petrov and Pere Toshev, who were in the Prilep district at the time of the uprising, as a partial explanation. A further reason was that an incident occurred before the uprising and put the Turkish troops on the alert.

On St Elijah's Day rebel militias cut the telegraph lines from Prilep to Bitola and Veles and destroyed the bridges on the roads to Grasko, Kichevo, Krushevo and Veles. On 23rd July they attacked the barracks and the town hall in one village.

In the Thessaloniki district, the largest in Macedonia and including the Thessaloniki, Sérrai and Dráma regional organizations of the revolutionary movement, the local leadership was opposed to the uprising because of disagreements - and even open hostility - between activists of the IMRO and centralists in the organization. Despite a temporary reconciliation relations remained frosty, and generally the operations conducted here were not well coordinated. It was only revolutionary militias which played an active role - the local population was advised to restrain from any particular activity and to simply help supply the revolutionaries. Most of the operations conducted were sabotage attacks, the most significant of which was the destruction of a 900m stretch of railway line and the railway bridge near Gevgelia at the end of July. The clamp-down in the district following bombings in Thessaloniki was also a significant factor in restricting the extent of the uprising here.

In the Skopje district, where the main leader was Nikola Pushkarov - later a respected Bulgarian soil scientist - the uprising mainly took the form of sabotage. On 1st August a dynamite attack caused the derailment of a military train with 32 wagons. The only exception to the pattern in this district was the area around Razlozhk, where the population actively participated in the uprising. After the quashing of the uprising the repression there was particularly severe.

In the Sérrai district the activity of the militias was of great practical significance. The militias held down a Turkish force of 20,000 troops which significantly assisted the uprising in the Bitola area - the main focus of rebel activity.

The uprising was accompanied by clashes between rebel militias and Turkish army troops, and even after the uprising was put down in September and October 1903 sporadic clashes continued through until the end of the year. At the height of the uprising a total of around 14,000-16,000 rebel fighters*6 armed with old rifles, axes, clubs and pitchforks faced a standing army of the Ottoman empire (200,000-300,000 men) with modern weaponry and equipment. Another problem was the generally poor coordination of operations and the lack of an effective joint command. The most responsible leaders of the movement foresaw such an outcome and were against launching the uprising prematurely precisely for this reason. The strategy was clear - no attacks were launched against major towns and cities, contrary to the advice of military experts. Despite their internationalist outlook, the rebels were not always able to secure the trust and assistance of people of all ethnic groups. In the liberated areas foundations were laid for a new and fairer way of life, but not everything necessary was done to protect the revolution.

In the Bitola district 746 rebels were killed in 150 clashes. In the Thessaloniki disrict there were 38 clashes and 109 rebels killed. In the Skopje district there were only 15 clashes but 93 rebel casualties. Everywhere the uprising ended in defeat, and the defeat was followed by gruesome retaliation which hit the civilian population hardest. In the four rebel operational regions - the Bitola, Thessaloniki and Skopje regions of Macedonia and the Odrin region of Thrace - more than 16 areas were affected: 201 villages were burnt down, 12,400 houses reduced to ashes. 4,694 people were massacred, 3,122 were raped, and 176 women and girls were abducted. 70,835 people were left homeless*7, and 30,000 refugees fled to the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria.

On 9th September 1903 Damyan Gruyev, Boris Sarafov and Lozanchev met to discuss the hopeless situation. They prepared a statement to the Bulgarian government which was sent to Sofia through the Bulgarian mission in Bitola. It read: "... Having been placed in leading positions of the popular movement here, we appeal to you in the name of the oppressed Bulgarian population to come to its assistance in as effective a manner a possible - through military intervention...".*8

Ten days later the General Staff decided to cease all revolutionary activity. The rebel forces - with the exception of regular militias - were declared disbanded.

[edit] Notes

NOTES: (These include both footnotes by the author and ones by the translator - the latter are marked "Trans.")

1. The Odrin region, as the author calls it in Bulgarian, is located around a town called Odrin which it has not been possible to find despite reference to a number of atlases. It may now be in Turkey and have a totally different Turkish name... In any case it is synonymous with Eastern Thrace - the region between the River Maritsa, which today forms the border between Greece and Turkey, and the Black Sea. (Trans.)

2. Makedonia i Odrinsko (1893-1903). Memoar na Vutreshnata organizatsia. Sofia, 1904, p. 119.

3. Ibid., p. 118.

4. Here and throughout this piece the term "Bulgarian" is used as a blanket term to mean both ethnic Bulgarians and ethnic Macedonians - southern Slavs - as distinct from the many other ethnic groups in the geographical region of Macedonia. The degree of cultural and linguistic similarity between Macedonians and Bulgarians is very high and it was only in the second half of the 20th century with the creation of a discrete Macedonian republic within Yugoslavia that clear linguistic and cultural distinctions between "Bulgarians" and "Macedonians" began to emerge and be codified. So here when the author uses the term Bulgarian he often means Macedonian, unless referring directly to the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria and the majority ethnic group there. (Trans.)

5. A small ethnic group - also called Vlachs - living in pockets in parts of the Balkans and beyond and speaking a language closely related to Romanian. (Trans.)

6. Kh. Silyanov, Osvoboditelnite borbi na Makedonia, vol. 1 - Ilindenskoto vustaniye, Sofia, 1933, pp. 442-443.

7. Makedonia i Odrinsko..., p. 182, 250.

8. Kh. Silyanov, Osvoboditelnite borbi..., pp. 434-435

• Translated from Bulgarian by Will Firth (with financial assistance from the Institute for Anarchist Studies). Thanks to Koicho Koichev for assistance with some difficult expressions.

This article can be found here.