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THE DARK SIDE OF FOOTBALL
Child and adult labour in India's football industry and the role of FIFA
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India Committee of the Netherlands
June 2000
The Dark Side of Football:
Child and adult labour in India's football industry and the role of FIFA
Text and photos: Gerard Oonk
Euro 2000 football photos: Hannelore Schultz
Lay-out: Anton van der Vlis
CONTENT
Preface
Part I
Summary
Conclusions and recommendations
Part II
Child and adult labour in India's football industry
Short history of the issue
The sports goods industry of India
Process of production of inflatable balls
The Sports Goods Foundation of India (SGFI)
Socio-economic position of stitchers' families
Child labour and its impact on education
Health problems
Wages below subsistence level
Stitching centres
Hiding production and child labour
Part III
The FIFA code of conduct and its follow-up
Short history of international involvement
Atlanta Agreement
From code to contract
Unresolved issues
Further developments
Preface
This report takes a close look at child labour and working conditions in the
sport goods industry in Punjab, India.
It also describes and discusses the various initiatives taken nationally and
internationally to tackle these issues. In India the initiatives of the South
Asian Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS) and the Sports Goods Foundation of
India (SGFI) are among the most prominent.
Internationally the World Federation of Sporting Goods Indus-try (WFSGI), FIFA
and its licensing organization ISL (Inter-national Sports and Leisure), the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as well as the major
sports goods companies play an important role. The International Labour Organization
(ILO) and UNICEF are other major players in the field of child rights and labour
rights.
This publication is the result of consulting many sources, not only written
information but also a number of organizations who are closely involved in the
issues at stake.
A very important source of information has been the authoritative report 'Child
labour in the sports goods industry - Jalandhar, A case study' based on research
conducted by the V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, India. Furthermore the
knowledge, field experience and cooperation of the organization 'Volunteers
for Social Justice - an NGO with a long experience on the issues of child labour,
bonded labour and migrant labour in Punjab - has been invaluable for the preparation
of this report.
I also would like to express my sincere thanks to the Sports Goods Foundation
of India and their 'stakeholders' who informed us in considerable detail about
their efforts to eliminate child labour in the sports goods industry.
Furthermore I want to thank the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) who provided information on the results of their negotiations with FIFA/ISL
on the 'FIFA Code of Labour Practice' and the contractual labour conditions
between ISL and sports goods com-panies.
Finally I want to express the hope that this report, though critical on various
aspects of present initiatives to elimin-ate child labour, will be seen as a
constructive contribution to the efforts of all those who wish to see an end
to child labour in the sports goods industry (and elsewhere) and who would like
to see this combined with equally strong efforts to guarantee the internationally
recognized labour rights of the workers in this industry.
June 2000
Gerard Oonk
Co-ordinator, India Committee of the Netherlands
PART I
Executive summary
In 1995 the first reports appeared in the newspapers about the large scale
use of child labour and exploitation of adults in the football industry of Sialkot,
Pakistan. A couple of years later it became clear that the same problem also
existed in India which, after Pakistan, is the second largest exporter of footballs
and other inflatable balls.
From the moment the issue was highlighted by the media and NGOs, especially
in the run-up to the 1996 European Football Championship, not only national
organizations in Pak-istan and India but also several international organizations
have been closely involved in the issue.
Prominently among them are the World Federation of Sporting Goods Industry
(WFSGI), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the Interna-tional
Labour Organization (ILO) and the international federation of football associations
(FIFA).
Also major sports companies such as Nike, Adidas, Reebok, Mitre (UK) and others
started taking a keen interest in the use of child labour in stitching footballs
because - to mention at least one important reason - it was spoiling their brand
image.
Whereas in Pakistan a programme to eliminate child labour from the football
industry has been in place since 1997, a similar programme in India - implemented
by the Sports Goods Foundation of India (SGFI) and funded by FIFA - started
on January 1st, 2000.
The South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS) was the first to highlight
the situation of child labour and unfair labour conditi-ons in the Indian sports
goods industry in 1997. SACCS initiated discussions with the sports goods industry
which broke off when the British organization Christian Aid published a report
with the help of SACCS which estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 children were working
in the sports goods industry. The manufacturers strongly objected to this figure
and started the Sports Goods Foundation of India (SGFI) with-out the cooperation
of SACCS.
The Christian Aid report did however prompt an independent research study funded
by ILO-IPEC and FICCI (a national employers' association). The research was
done by the V.V. Giri National Labour Institute (NLI). Their report, 'Child
labour in the sports goods industry; Jalandhar, A Case Study' (further called
the 'NLI report'), came to the conclusion that around 10,000 children are stitching
footballs in the district of Jalandhar. Other producing areas were not included.
The report, published in September 1998, also provides a wealth of information
on the socio-economic conditions of the stitchers. It is therefore the main
source of the following description of these conditions.
Stitching footballs is largely a home-based industry in which the manufacturing-/-exporting
companies produce the 'panels' of the balls in their factories and hire contractors
who act as middlemen between them and the home-based workers who stitch the
balls. Almost half of the stitchers are living below the 'poverty line' and
four out of ten households are headed by illiterate adults. About 90% of the
households belong to the so-called 'untouchables', or Dalits as they prefer
to call themselves. Their human rights are violated in many spheres of life
especially when they dare to assert and organize themselves. Dalits, including
their children, are the main victims of bonded labour and child labour.
The NLI report estimates the average daily earning of an adult male in the
sports goods industry to be around Rs.20 (less than half a US dollar) which
is about one third of the present minimum wage of Rs.63 a day. Stitchers are
normally not aware of the concept of minimum wage and are not organized by any
trade union. Any protest or attempt to organize themselves can be easily crushed
as they are dependent on the contractors for work. The piece rates for stitching
a football are not determined on the basis of time needed to stitch a ball in
relation to the right to earn at least a minimum income. Furthermore the stitchers
are routinely cheated by the contractors. The NLI advises doing away with the
contractor system and making the manufac-turers/exporters responsible for the
payment of wages.
It is estimated that 10,000 children are working in the production of sports
goods in and around Jalandhar, 1,350 of whom are 'only working' (OW), while
the rest are both working and going to school. Stitching of footballs is being
done by children from five years and older. Of all the full-time working child-ren
37% are between five and twelve and the rest are thirteen or four-teen. Of the
working-and-school going (WSG) children two-thirds are between five and twelve,
indicating that most children are starting to stitch footballs when they are
quite young. The combination of school and work leads most children to drop
out around the age of ten.
The work intensity of the stitching children is high. A six year old 'only
working child' spends on average 7.5 hours stitching balls while a thirteen
year old child spends 9 hours. 'WSG children' even have to shoulder a bigger
work burden: 9 hours when they are six and almost 11 hours when they are thirteen.
A quarter of the OW children work at night compared to 14% of the WSG children.
Almost half of the 'only working' children and less than a third of the 'WSG
children' report some health problem. The most common problems are joint pains
and backache.
The NLI report was to become the basis for an initiative by the SGFI, the WFSGI,
Save the Children and ILO-IPEC, the child labour programme of the Interna-tional
Labour Organization (ILO). ILO-IPEC would supervise the external monitoring
of stitching locations and US$3 million was to be funded by the US government
for the monitoring system and the rehabilitation of the children. The 25 exporter-members
of the SGFI promised to start an internal monitoring system on child labour
and to ensure that the workers would earn at least the official minimum wage.
The Indian government however refused to accept ILO-IPEC as the external supervisor.
They also refused the money from the USA for the project and, just like most
exporters, did not want SACCS to be part of the new initiative.
After the 'expulsion' of ILO-IPEC, the SGFI went ahead with a programme to
prevent and rehabilitate child labour in the sports goods industry. SGFI, under
the guidance of the WFSGI, ISL and major sports goods companies, hired the well-known
auditing company SGS (Societé General de Surveillance) to do the external monitoring
of the stitching locations. The list of these locations is provided by the manufac-turers
on the basis of their internal monitoring. The external monitor-ing is now funded
by FIFA, while the manufacturers contribute 0.25% of their export earnings for
the rehabilitation of the children.
In a period of two years the SGFI plans to concentrate all stitching in registered
centres with more than eight workers or units with at least three workers. Elimination
of child labour and fair wages should be the result. In addition SGFI has hired
the Indian Council of Child Welfare (ICCW) to create awareness among the stitchers'
families on the child labour issue. ICCW has recruited students of a girls'
college to do this work, joined by some wives of exporters.
A 'social protection programme', for which Save the Children and UNICEF would
make further plans and possibly provide funds, has not started yet. During the
first round of external monitoring by SGS only one working child was found,
which makes it unclear for Save the Children, UNICEF and other stakeholders
if and how to start a programme.
Combining the results of the NLI report, local research and recent meetings
with most of the organizations involved in the issue the following additional
points emerge (see also the con-clusions and recommendations):
* Stitchers are still earning wages far below the official minimum wage. This
fact is being denied by the Sports Goods Foundation of India, not checked as
part of their internal monitoring and not externally monitored and verified
by SGS.
* Stitchers are not organized in a trade union. Their absolute dependence on
the contractors for work makes this almost impossible. Not the stitchers themselves
but the contractors 'bargain' with the employers about the piece rates for stitching.
* Considering the health problems of children stitching footballs it can be
concluded that stitching footballs is an hazardous occupation.
* The successful elimination of child labour depends on an effective 'social
protection programme' which now seems to get stuck because 'no children are
found'. An essential part of this social protection should be the willingness
of the industry to pay living wages, at least the official minimum wages.
* The newly set up stitching centres are exempted from the Factory Act. This
act gives employees a number of rights, including a labour contract, an annual
bonus, double pay for overtime etc., which are now being denied.
* There is strong evidence that a few members of the SGFI are hiding a part
of their production from the monitoring system, in particular the largest exporter
Mayor & Co. This company is supplying balls to Adidas, Mitre and Mundo, as well
as to other FIFA/ISL-licensed companies. Mayor & Co also supplies footballs
with a Euro 2000 design for the European market, imported under FIFA/ISL-license
by 'Mookie Toys' (see photos).
* The contractual agreements between the ISL (the licensing organization of
FIFA) and all licensed football importing companies who buy their balls in India
are violated on the issues of (hiding) child labour, wages below the official
minimum, misuse of advances paid to workers, obstacles to the right to organize,
exemption from existing labour legislation and lacking health standards and
sanitary facilities.
Conclusions and recommendations
1. All available evidence points to the fact that most stit-chers in India,
either working at home or in stitching centres, do not earn even half the minimum
wage of Rs.63 a day or Rs.1,753 a month. The sports goods exporters who have
joined the SGFI do have the responsibility - to which they agreed in November
1998 - to ensure that the workers at least earn the minimum wage for an eight
hour day of work.
This responsibility should at least result in:
- paying piece rates that make it possible for stitchers working eight hours
a day to earn at least the official minimum wage (see also point 2);
- informing all stitchers orally and on paper about piece rates. This should
not be done by the contractors but by persons appointed by the SGFI and/or its
Steering Committee; information on piece rates should be available in all stitching
locations;
- including questions about number of balls produced and real wages paid in
the internal monitoring system of the SGFI and registration of piece rates and
real wages paid in the registers of all stitching centres and units.
2. There is strong evidence that the SGFI and individual exporters are overstating
the number of balls that can be stitched in a normal working day. This leads
them to claim that stitchers can easily earn the minimum wage or more, while
in reality they can produce much less and earn far less than the minimum wage.
In order to fix piece rates in a way that leads to payment of at least the official
minimum wage, the recommendation of the V.V. Giri National Labour Institute
that a scientific study should be undertaken to determine the real time needed
to stitch different types of inflatable balls, is still extremely valid.
3. At present the stitching centres set up by sports goods exporters are exempted
from the Factory Act which stipulates that working units with more than twenty
employees should be registered under it. The Factory Act gives employees a number
of rights, including a labour contract, an annual bonus, double pay for overtime
etc.
It is unacceptable that the stitching centres are exempted from the Factory
Act.
4. There is strong evidence that at least some members of the SGFI are deliberately
hiding a considerable part of their production from the monitoring system. This
implies that there is no check on child labour and working conditions in the
area where this production is found: the district of Gurdaspur. Especially India's
largest sports goods exporter, Mayor & Co, seems to be involved in this. A programme
designed to monitor child labour has no credibility when part of the production
is hidden by some members of the SGFI. It is not only a blatant violation of
the system but, if unchecked, also leads to additional movement of stitching
outside the area which is monitored. Internal and external monitors should therefore
make sure to include all stitching locations of the SGFI-members.
5. It is clear from the NLI report that both full-time and part-time child
labour is violating the right of the child to recreation and to full-time education
until he or she is at least 14 years of age. Though some efforts are undertaken
by the SGFI, the present approach is not likely to be sufficient to eliminate
child labour effectively and give these children the right to full-time education.
The success of creating community awareness on the need to eliminate child
labour in the sports goods industry as well as monitoring of this industry on
child labour, depends to a large extent on involving the community and local
NGOs in the effort. Against this background the present awareness raising efforts
by the Indian Council of Child Welfare do lack the necessary credibility. College
students and wives of exporters cannot be expected to make a real impact in
this situation. The SGFI and its Steering Committee have to co-operate with
local communities and credible local NGOs who should take the lead on this.
6. The successful elimination of child labour also crucially depends on an
effective 'social protection programme' which now seems to get stuck because
'no children are found'. An essential part of this social protection should
be the willingness of the industry to pay living wages, at least minimum wages.
This would also create trust with the stitchers' families. It would show them
that the industry is serious about their welfare and the education of their
children. Furthermore a programme of transitional education centres, as earlier
decided upon by the SGFI and their stakeholders, should be implemented in order
to prepare full-time working children for government schools. Similarly, tutorials
for part-time working children to catch up in school should be provided. UNICEF
and Save the Children would be in a position to prepare plans for this and generate
the necessary resources.
7. Eliminating child labour in the sports goods industry can be an important
first step to eliminate child labour in other sectors. For this to happen a
combination of specific measures to phase out child labour through a targeted
regional approach in combination with improving the system of primary education
is of crucial importance. Strategies and programmes should therefore be developed
to keep children in school until they finish 10th grade of elementary education.
Improvement of the quality of education is essential to reach this goal, but
also social mobilization to establish and enforce the social norm that no child
should work. The SGFI and other organizations, like UNICEF and Save the Children,
can play an important role in stimulating the local and state government to
take up its responsibility to offer every child the right to full-time elementary
education.
8. Considering the health problems of children stitching footballs it can be
concluded that stitching footballs is an hazardous occupation. Further research
should establish the character and magnitude of the health problems. Also in
the case of adults it is recommended to undertake a scientific study into the
health hazards of manufacturing sports goods. On the basis of this research
a plan of action to protect the health of sports goods workers should be formulated
and implemented.
9. The contractual agreements between the ISL and their licensees (including
all major football importing com-panies) are violated on a number of points:
- The contract states that no child who is less than 14 years old shall be
employed. There is however ample evidence that some members of the foundation
are hiding a part of their production - and thus the use of child labour - from
the monitoring system funded by FIFA.
- The contract has the provision that 'workers should be paid at least the
legal minimum legal wage or a wage that is consistent with local industry standards,
which-ever is greater'. It is quite evident that the wages of most stitchers
are below the legal minimum wage.
- The contract states that 'advances on and deductions from wages should be
carefully monitored'. No such monitoring exists so that contractors can use
the advances to take deductions from the wages without any form of third party
monitoring.
- The contract recognizes that 'the right of workers to join and organize associations
of their own choosing should be respected'. The present contract system makes
it de facto almost impossible to use this fundamental labour right as the stitchers
are absolutely dependent on the contractors.
- The contract states that 'factories ['and those who supply them'] shall comply
with all applicable laws and regulations regarding working conditions'. The
fact that the stitching centres are exempted from the Fac-tory Act is at least
a violation of the spirit of this provision.
- The contract states that 'standards and procedures should be elaborated to
protect workers from fire, accidents and toxic substances'. Stitchers do work
with and inhale toxic substances (like ink and glue), but there are no standards
and pro-cedures to protect the workers.
- The contract states that 'workers should have access at all times to sanitary
facilities'. Observations show that such facilities are lacking in several stitching
centres.
10. The mandate of the external monitoring company SGS does not at all reflect
the provisions of the present contracts between ISL and their licensees. The
terms of reference for monitoring are largely confined to child labour. This
might not be a violation in letter of the contract, but it certainly is in contradiction
with the spirit of the provision in the contract that ISL 'may request evidence
of compliance with the code'. The best way to provide this evidence is to include
it in the terms of refer-ence of SGS as the appointed external monitoring organization.
11. The SGFI and its Steering Committee of the SGFI, in consultation with local
communities, NGOs, unions and others, should find ways to implement the important
conclusion of the NLI report that the contractor system should be replaced by
a system with effective monitoring and regulation by the state, employers and
trade unions. In addition the idea to form labour co-operatives should be further
studied and implemented with the help of NGOs and unions.
12. Bringing an end to the use of child labour and guaran-teeing basic labour
rights in the sports goods industry of course goes beyond the influence of FIFA
and other football associations alone. Therefore all companies should, regardless
of their relation to FIFA and ISL, have a code of labour practice which is at
least as good as the original FIFA Code and is independently monitored and verified.
13. It is strongly recommended that football importing com-panies do not stop
sourcing from their existing suppliers in India. They should rather use their
influence to make sure that the present contracts between ISL and them-selves
as ISL licensees are implemented in letter and spirit and are being improved
upon. For this to happen they have to pay prices that makes it possible for
the Indian suppliers them to establish and pay for the working conditions agreed
upon.
14. The Code of Labour Practice initially agreed upon by FIFA and the Interna-tional
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) - if signed, incorporated in the
ISL agreements, implemented and effectively monitored - would be an important
instrument to improve labour conditions in the sporting goods industry worldwide.
The present contrac-tual arrange-ments fall considerably short of that as there
are still a number of unre-solved problems in terms of both the content and
the implementation of the ISL arrange-ments.
15. An active role of the ILO - not only ILO-IPEC like in the case of Pakistan
- in the monitoring and verification of FIFA Code would be highly desirable.
This would not only give an important impetus to the status and credibility
of the FIFA Code, but could also be a pilot for the involvement of the ILO in
giving guidance to the content and implementation of other codes of conduct
which are (partly) based on ILO Conven-tions.
The India Committee of the Netherlands (ICN) is an independent non-governmental
organization, which aims to contribute to a more humane life for the poor and
oppressed in India. ICN cooperates with organizations in India and elsewhere
with a similar objective. It informs the public, particularly in The Netherlands,
about social, economic and political developments in India and how they relate
to such developments in western countries.
ICN takes up campaigns in the areas of human rights, economic relations and
interna-tional cooperation. Its main strategy is to influence public opinion
and decision makers in the Netherlands, Europe and possibly elsewhere. It does
this, among other means, through research, lobbying, mobilization of the public,
generating publicity and organizing meetings. ICN is not a funding organization.
India Committee of the Netherlands
Mariaplaats 4
3511 LH Utrecht, The Netherlands
tel. 00-31-30-2321340
fax. 00-31-30-2322246
e-mail: liw@antenna.nl
website: www.antenna.nl/liw
The Clean Clothes Campaign
PO BOX 11584
1001 GN Amsterdam
+31-20-4122785
+31-20-4122786
ccc@xs4all.nl
www.cleanclothes.org
last updated: December 24, 2004
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