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July 9, 1999
ENGLISH VERSION OF "CHIAPAS AL DIA" BULLETIN No. 161
CIEPAC
CHIAPAS, MEXICO
(July 9, 1999)
THE OTHER CHIAPAS IN FIGURES
The situation in the indigenous communities in Chiapas is not a secret to anyone
today. The state, national and international media, the Internet and electronic
mail from all parts of the world are constantly reporting what we are
describing here. We have reviewed the Historic Archives of the former
National Intermediation Commission (CONAI), which is made up in very large
part of letters from the different communities, who were always asking
that body to use their good offices to act as an intermediary with the
government for the withdrawal of the police forces from their communities.
The analysis here is based on those letters, copies of which were usually
forwarded to the corresponding government departments. It is therefore,
not a secret to anyone. We are simple taking up the task here of ordering,
writing about and interpreting the situation, according to the voices
of those without voice.
We know that, as civil society, we have the right and the freedom to
know and to write about what affects all of us, independent of whom it
is about. That is why we are taking it upon ourselves to talk about the
occupation of the chiapaneco land by institutions and police bodies foreign
to the indigenous communities and their impact on them.
This is how we discovered that there are 257 military and police checkpoints
in Chiapas, distributed in 63 municipalities, or, in 55.85% of all the
municipalities in the state. They are distributed in the following manner:
MEXICAN ARMY: They are established in 161 locations in Chiapas, representing
62.64% in relation to the municipalities and places where other bodies
are established in the state. It is very difficult to speak of an exact
number of soldiers, since there are continuous troop replacements.
PUBLIC SECURITY POLICE: This force is set up in 57 locations in chiapaneco
communities, representing 22.17% of the control points counted here.
NATIONAL IMMIGRATION INSTITUTE: This institution increased its level
of activities following the Intergalactic Encuentros convoked by the zapatistas
in August 1996. After April 11, 1998, however, they set themselves up
at strategic points, as a result of the dismantling of the "Ricardo Flores
Magon" Autonomous Municipality, in the constitutional municipality of
Ocosingo. Twelve Spanish and US foreigners were expelled from there. Today,
this body is located in 24 places, representing 9.33%, in relation to
the total of the police and military forces present in Chiapas. It would
appear that it has carried out the role assigned to it. According to the
US organization Global Exchange, in its "Foreigners of Conscience" report:
in 1998, 70 foreigners had been expelled from the country prior to the
issuing of the report. 144 had been given official departure letters,
that is, the official argument being that they had been invited to leave
the country, which is nothing more than disguised expulsion. However,
those expelled in 1994 should also be remembered, beginning with Frederico
(without his last names being remembered today), a Belgian, who was in
Chiapas in solidarity, helping the Guatemalan refugee camps. Among others
to be noted would be those from 1995-1997 and thus far in 1999. There
have been more than 200. The argument that has been used is that they
were involved in the country's domestic policies, and Article 133 of the
Constitution and the General Residence Law were applied.
PGR and PJE: These forces are present in 13 locations, strategically
placed, representing 5.05% of the total. We will not deal here with their
establishment in urban areas.
SPECIAL FORCES: Regarding these types of forces, we are referring to
Force and Reaction, a dependency of the state Attorney General's Office.
They are - according to what we have seen and to reports in the state
press - located at the entrance to the Venustiano Carranza municipality
and also at the Chivero in the San Cristobal municipality. That is, in
two places and representing 0.77% of the total. It should be noted that
the information regarding this force is from 1996 and was reported in
the state press.
The total number of forces accounted for here is 257. It is possible
that there are more forces in place, but this is what has been reported
by the communities and reviewed today from the Historical Archive of the
former National Intermediation Commission (CONAI).
According to descriptions from the communities - in their letters where
they ask for the withdrawal of the army and of other police forces - there
are 26 permanent checkpoints in the municipalities of Ocosingo, Las Margaritas,
Chenalho, Larrainzar, El Bosque, Palenque and Frontera Comalapa. The other
locations are barracks, camps or places from which flights, patrols, military
supervision, etcetera, are controlled.
Public Security forces are established in sites throughout the area of
zapatista support bases, that is, outside those municipalities taken by
the EZLN on January 1, 1994, such as Chenalho in Los Altos, the municipalities
of the Northern zone, and others in the Central. Meanwhile, in February
1995, the army took possession of the land that the EZLN had under its
control, primarily in the Selva and Los Altos.
Some police and military forces are established in the Coastal and Isthmus
zones, as part of the cordon set up to reinforce the containment wall
for the undocumented in that zone, whose final destination is the United
States. According to reports from the National Immigration Institute,
there have been around 28,000 undocumented persons detained and deported
to their countries of origin during the first six months of 1999, most
of them Central and South Americans.
Some of the Central Valleys do not have as much police and military presence,
but they do not need to be controlled politically, since they are already
controlled through the Campesino Teachers Solidarity Organization (SOCAMA),
that is tied to the PRI
(In order to better visualize what we are describing in this part, we
suggest you look at the militarization map on our web page: www.ciepac.org.
The green dots correspond to army positions in 1994, the red dots from
February 1995 to the present; blue is the Public Security police and yellow
the NII).
In June of 1999, a new strategy was begun regarding the conflict in Chiapas:
the attempt has been made to destroy the EZLN as the interlocutor for
national transformations, and reduce it to a state force, so that their
demands would be dealt with locally. This is why the Public Security Police
went into action in Las Canadas of the Selva, so that the army would not
be so visible. The army has not withdrawn, it has rather formed a containment
wall for the State Police. And thus the statement by Governor Roberto
Albores, saying to Subcomandante Marcos that it is now "the time to negotiate."
In addition to this there has been the federal government policy of promoting
reforms in indigenous matters in all the states, in order to invalidate
the San Andres Accords and to take away from the Federal Congress the
Constitutional reforms regarding the accords signed between the EZLN and
the government, in matters of Indigenous Rights and Culture.
OCCURRENCES FROM YEAR TO YEAR
From the time of the armed uprising in January of 1994, through February 1995,
the communities reported 74 control points and locations where the army
was established, especially around the area controlled by the EZLN.
From February 1995 through December 1996, as a product of the military
offensive, the army set up in 94 places, primarily in territory the EZLN
had under its control in the Selva Lacandona. There had been an increase
of 127.02% since 1994. From January 1997 through June 1998, the army set
up in 45 places, primarily in the months of January, February and March
[1998], in the Chenalho area, following the Acteal massacre. This represented
an increase of 40.69% in militarization and the establishment of police
forces compared to the previously noted period. Thus far in 1999, the
army and different police forces, public security police and the National
Immigration Institute have established themselves in 20 more locations,
primarily in the Selva Lacandona, the Northern zone and Los Altos of Chiapas,
representing a 10% increase in relation to the previous period noted here.
It is true that the EZLN declared war on the Mexican army on January
1, 1994, and the government has justified the excessive militarization
because of that. As long as the EZLN does not withdraw, the army will
not be leaving the communities. The number of military personnel is excessive,
and their actions are not helping find a solution to the armed conflict.
The problem is that the government is not paying any attention to the
demands that gave rise to the armed conflict: land, health, education,
work, independence, democracy, justice, liberty, housing, food, autonomy,
etcetera. The investments - of which there is so much talk - have more
to do with counterinsurgency, political favoritism in the run-up to the
next election and the feigning of the self disarmament by EZLN members.
La Jornada recently revealed, on June 29, 1999, that the Alternative Consultancy
A.C. (a purported NGO directed by the sister of Adolfo Orive, the former
coordinator of advisors for the Department of Government, and now member
of Francisco Labastida Ochoa's campaign team) will be investing 108,860,564
pesos for the Selva Lacandona ( loans from the World Bank to Mexico).
This is nothing more than counterinsurgency taxes that hope to rebuild
the PRI prior to the elections. It is also an attempt to take support
away from the EZLN and to rebuild the Rural Association of Collective
Interests (ARIC) Official. The latter have been the shock troops against
the zapatistas, the ARIC Independent and Democratic and the Union of Unions,
among others, who make up the Coalition of Autonomous Organizations of
Ocosingo (COAO) and the CIOAC in the region of Las Margaritas.
THE MUNICIPALITIES WITH THE GREATEST PRESENCE
The municipalities with the greatest police and military presence are Ocosingo,
with 37; Chenalho, 27; Las Margaritas, 20; Tila, 20; Venustiano Carranza,
10; San Cristobal de Las Casas, 9; Palenque, 8; Angel Albino Corzo, 7;
Motozintla, 6; Altamirano, 5; Cintalapa, 5; Tapachula, 5; San Andres Larrainzar,
4 and Sabanilla, 4.
THE IMPACT OF A RECKLESS STRATEGY
In the Economic Arena:
Destruction of maize, beans, coffee harvests, and others. Creation of
an artificial market for street vendors and for those women who wash clothes
for the police forces; at the checkpoints, the continuous searches of
basic needs items that the indigenous buy in the municipal seats; control
of the sale of basic needs products in rural CONASUPO shops, that is,
the store manager asks for identification and sells without any problems
to those with PRI credentials; excessive felling of trees for the construction
of military barracks and camps; invasion of communal lands without the
indigenous having the opportunity to reclaim them; delivery of aid to
communities who are identified with, or who are members of, the PRI; delivery
of sweets and money to minors, in order for them to inform on those who
belong to the EZLN or to independent organizations; transfer of the communities'
coffee harvests to the municipal seats for their marketing, among other
things; and the establishment of a police military encirclement of growing
lands.
In the Political Arena:
Harassment and repression of communities who do not belong to the PRI;
control of strategic roads and highways through permanent and intermittent
checkpoints; location of leaders of opposition campesino organizations;
intimidation of the communities' catechists and religious authorities;
constant overflights and patrols; support for Public Security Police and
PRI groups in the dismantling of Autonomous Municipalities, among other
things.
In the Social Arena:
Introduction of alcoholism, drug addiction and prostitution into the
communities; with the consequent resulting venereal and infectious diseases;
the depositing of garbage and condoms in the streams; delivery of economic
aid, food, haircuts, the painting of schools, medical services, etcetera,
especially to PRI members; the inducement of girls and women in the rural
communities into prostitution; accompanying PRI members and Public Security
Police when they have taken over and destroyed Catholic Churches belonging
to the Diocese of San Cristobal; there are various places where they are
installed in schools, occupying a space where the classrooms should be
being used by children, among other things. It is sufficient to mention
the example of the Health Center in the municipal seat of Sabanilla, that
is converted, today, into a Public Security Police detachment.
The consequences for the communities have been: the breaking of the community
social fabric; the breaking of the unity of social organizations and worsening
of internal conflicts; the creation of a military siege and a siege of
hunger, that seeks to weaken the resistance of the indigenous peoples
and communities; an attempt to control traditional and religious authorities,
for the purpose of wresting strength and authority from the Diocese of
San Cristobal; creating fear and terror among the people, for the purpose
of undermining moral resistance; at the same time, destroying the values
that give unity and strength to the communities; increase in human rights
violations; increase in illiteracy; increase in crime rates and social
backwardness in the communities, among many other things.
GENERAL COMMENTS
The problem of militarization has structural causes, that is, as the Mexican
government and the PRI have been losing consensus within the population,
there are more obstacles in place for implementation and operation of
the neoliberal program. One of those obstacles is the struggle and resistance
of the indigenous peoples in opposition to the Free Trade Treaty [NAFTA],
signed between the United States, Canada and Mexico. Militarization is
not just a problem in Chiapas. It exists all over the country, especially
in the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero, Puebla, Hidalgo, Veracruz, San Luis
Potosi, Monterrey, and others. Whether or not insurgent movements exist,
social discontent is increasing in the country, with the official response
being the occupation of indigenous and non-indigenous lands. The military
is increasingly occupying spaces in institutions responsible for public
security. The clearest example of this is that of the 5000 soldiers recently
transferred to the preventive police (Excelsior, 7/9/99).
Responding to the demands of social organizations and of various sectors
of society with militarization is not the solution. On the contrary, it
leads to polarization in society, the creation of vacuums that are filled
primarily by criminals and organized crime. It is enough to mention the
recent "assault" on the Presidential General Staff and a Public Security
barracks. Militarization and the creation of more police forces will not
do away with this problem. The culture of corruption must be eradicated,
the repression, the deception and the lie, in all spheres and at all levels
of government in the country. The measures taken up to now have been ineffective.
On the contrary, they have caused a greater deterioration, not just in
social relations, but also in the government police forces, such as the
SEDESOL and the NII in the Selva. These groups are nothing more than white
elephants, without credibility or trust, because they have only served
to strengthen the PRI. One of the most serious threats is the underlying
threat of a war of greater magnitude and its social consequences. Acting
out of a thirst for revenge, or treating organizations and communities
as enemies, is not the solution either. They are Mexican citizens, after
all, who do not agree with the way of life they have. They want to change,
and the solution to their problems should be effected without political
cronyism. They should be treated as human beings, in all aspects. The
disarmament show and the announcement of great investment programs are
only cosmetics for the government's image, not solutions to the ancestral
causes which have given rise to a series of conflicts.
Onesimo Hidalgo
Center of Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action,
A.C.
CIEPAC
CIEPAC, member of the "Convergence of Civil Organizations for Democracy"
National Network (CONVERGENCIA)
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Translated by irlandesa for CIEPAC, A.C.
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_________________________________________________________________________
CIEPAC, A.C.
Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Political Action
Eje Vial Uno Numero 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristobal, Chiapas, MEXICO
Telephone/Fax: In Mexico: 01 967 85832
Outside Mexico: +52 967 85832.
_____________________________________________________________________
CIEPAC, A.C.
Centro de Investigaciones Económicas y Políticas de Acción Comunitaria
Eje Vial Uno Número 11
Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa
29297 San Cristóbal, Chiapas, MEXICO
Tel/Fax: en México 01 967 85832
fuera de México +52 967 85832
Página Web: www.ciepac.org
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last updated: January 30, 2005
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